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Comments
Workmen's Compensation Claimants' Latent
or Unknown Injuries-Prescription
Albert Tate, Jr.*
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act provides a one
year limitation against filing suit from the date of the (1) acci-
dent, (2) death, (3) last compensation payment, or (4) devel-
opment of the injury "where the injury does not result at the
time of, or develop immediately after the accident."1 Under the
last denoted limitation to claims arising from latent or unknown
injuries, a problem arises as to when an injury "develops," espe-
cially when due to mistaken surgical diagnosis an injured em-
ployee may not realize the seriousness of his disability or its
relation to the accident until more than one year has elapsed
from the date of the accident or the last compensation payment.
Three recent cases concerning these latent or unknown injuries
have clarified various aspects of the problem and the previous
jurisprudence, namely, Morgan v. Rust Engineering Company,
2
Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Company,3 and Manuel v.
Travelers Insurance Company.
4
* B.A., George Washington University (1941); LL.B., Yale Law School
(1947). Member, Louisiana Bar.
1. La. R.S. (1950) 23:1209 (Section 31 of La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended
by La. Act 85 of 1926, and La. Act 29 of 1934): "In case of personal injury
(including death resulting therefrom) all claims for payments shall be
forever barred unless within one year after the accident or death the parties
have agreed upon the payments to be made under this Chapter or unless
within one year after the accident proceedings have been begun as provided
in Parts III and IV of this Chapter. Where such payments have been made in
any case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year
from the time of making the last payment. Also, where the injury does not
result at the time of, or develop immediately after the accident, the limitation
shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time the injury
develops, but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred
unless the proceedings have been begun within two years from the date of
the accident."
(The portion in italics, being the amendment of La. Act 29 of 1934, is the
statutory provision relating to latent or unknown injuries; it will be noted
that in any event suit for these latent or unknown injuries is perempted or
prescribed after two years from the date of the accident.)
2. 52 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1951).
3. 49 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 1950).
4. 46 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 1950).
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In the Mottet case,5 the accident in which the claimant was
injured occurred on January 27, 1946, but (his condition being
incorrectly diagnosed as non-disabling neuritis) he continued his
work at heavy duties despite increasing pain until September,
1946, when an orthopedic surgeon correctly diagnosed the injury
as a herniated disc, a disabling injury. Plaintiff informed his
employers of this and was transferred to lighter duties until
March 11, 1947, when his condition became so painful that plain-
tiff was forced to quit his employment. Suit was filed August 4,
1947. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's judgment for the plaintiff on the merits and sustained
the defendant's plea of prescription or peremption.6
The court stated that the prescriptive period does not begin
"from the time of an accurate diagnosis of an injury, but from
the development of the injury" and further stated that the test
was "'When did plaintiff's right and cause of action for com-
pensation accrue?'- 7 The court held that this was not March 11,
1947, when plaintiff alleged "repeated traumatic strains . . .
eventually resulted in complete total and permanent disability";
8
nor was it September, 1946, when for the first time the disabling
nature of plaintiff's injury was correctly diagnosed.9 It held that
this date was January 27, 1946, when plaintiff alleged and proved
an accident occurred, following which he suffered "severe and
continuous pain."
Manuel v. Travelers Insurance Company'° dealt with the
reverse facet of the problem. On April 30, 1948, the plaintiff
sustained a knee injury in the course of his employment, was
operated upon and given medical treatment, and was paid com-
pensation through October 1, 1948, when he was discharged as
completely recovered. On October 27 or 28, 1949, the plaintiff
suffered a recurrence of the injury when he bent to pick up his
5. 49 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 1950).
6. Although technically the delay in which rights may be exercised under
the Louisiana Compensation Act is a peremption rather than a prescription
period, Brister v. Wray, Dickinson Co., Inc., 183 La. 562, 164 So. 415 (1935), in
deference to the almost universal usage of the bar it will be referred to
herein as "prescription."
7. 49 So. 2d 38, 40 (La. App. 1950).
8. Ibid.
9. Plaintiff also unsuccessfully sought to avoid prescription by the argu-
ment that the wages received when transferred to lighter work were in lieu
of compensation, Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 194 So. 99 (La.
App. 1940); which plea, since plaintiff was paid the regular scale wage for
the lighter work, was disallowed. 49 So. 2d 38, 41 (La. App., 1950).
10. 46 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 1950).
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razor while shaving before reporting to work with a subsequent
employer. The First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's sustaining of the defendant's plea of prescription against
the compensation insurer of the April 30, 1948, employer. It held
that the one year limitation did not apply following October 1,
1948 (date of last compensation payment), when plaintiff was
discharged as completely cured. "He did not suffer any disability
for a period of more than a year thereafter," since on October 27
or 28, 1949 plaintiff suffered a second injury arising from the
same accident of April 30, 1948, which did not manifest itself
until it "suddenly developed on October 27 or 28, 1949, as a direct
and proximate result of the accident on April 30, 1948.""l
Both of these decisions are in accordance with the previous
jurisprudence to the effect that an injury "manifests" itself with-
in the meaning of the act when its physical symptoms appear,
and not when its relationship to the accident in the course of
employment is made manifest by correct surgical diagnosis,
even though plaintiff is inhibited from enforcing his rights under
the compensation act by mistaken diagnosis by physicians. 12
11. Id. at 325. Otherwise stated, prescription was tolled between the date
when the injury was cured and the date when it reoccurred.
The court also resisted the defendant's efforts to restrict the saving effect
of the amendment of La. Act 29 of 1934, note 1 supra, to those cases where
no injury at all resulted at the time of the accident, thus applying the clause,
"where the injury does not result at the time of, or develop immediately after
the accident" as restricting the two-year saving period to latent or unknown
injuries only where no injury at all develops at the time of the accident, but
one becomes manifest at a later date, as in Guderien v. Sterling Sugar & Ry.
Co. Ltd., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546 (1922).
12. Hannafin v. Pelican Cracker Factory, Inc., 185 So. 479 (La. App. 1939);
Jaume v. Maison Blanche Co., 193 So. 905 (La. App. 1940); Richard v. Blair,
20 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 1945); Esthey v. Avondale Marineways, Inc., 25 So. 2d
631 (La. App. 1946); Stephenson v. McCook Brothers Funeral Home, Inc., 27
So. 2d 644 (La. App. 1946). See also Perkins v. American Employers Ins. Co.,
53 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 1951).
An earlier line of jurisprudence holding that under the original Section
31 of the Employers' Liability Act, La. Act 20 of 1914, the one year's prescrip-
tion ran not from the date of the physical accident but from the date the
employee became aware of the injury, White v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co.,
174 La. 308, 140 So. 486 (1932), and (lower appellate decision) 135 So. 255 (La.
App. 1931); Guderien v. Sterling Sugar & Ry. Co. Ltd., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546
(1922); West v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 128 So. 678 (La. App. 1930); and
Jones v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 1 La. App. 88 (1924),
was ended by the holdings that the amendment of La. Act 85 of 1926 to Sec-
tion 31 by substituting "within one year after the accident" for the former
"within one year after the injury" had overruled these holdings and com-
menced prescription from the date of the physical accident rather than the
employee's awareness of the injurious results thereof, Carroll v. International
Paper C6., 175 La. 315, 143 So. 275 (1932); White v. Louisiana Western Ry.,
174 La. 308, 140 So. 486 (1932), and see Trichell v. Stovall Drilling Co., 150 So.
869 (La. App. 1933). Act*29 of 1934 amended the section to preserve for two
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However, in Morgan v. Rust Engineering Company,13 the
trial court's sustaining of the defendant's plea of prescription was
reversed, and the case was remanded for trial on the merits under
the following allegations of fact: On July 15, 1946, while work-
ing, plaintiff suffered sharp pains in his back. He reported to the
employer's physician, who advised him that his pains were due
to prostatitis, a condition not associated with the accident, which
condition would be cured by minor treatment and rest. After
this treatment and after a stay at home without working for six
months (during which time his back "bothered him only occa-
sionally and at intervals when he exerted himself") ,'14 plaintiff
attempted to return to work for another employer but was forced
due to the increasing intensity of the pain to abandon this
employment and report to Charity Hospital for treatment approx-
imately in August of 1947. It was only at this later date that the
injury "manifested itself to petitioner and to the doctors at the
Charity Hospital,"'" when it was correctly diagnosed as a dis-
abling ruptured intervertebral disc resulting from the accident
occurring in the course of employment.
Although the plaintiff experienced sudden pains while work-
ing, the Orleans Court of Appeal held that "he did not become
aware that the pains resulted from an injury until several months
afterward, when the doctors at the Charity Hospital in New
Orleans discovered that the pains resulted from a ruptured inter-
vertebral disc."' 6
The court distinguished the Morgan case from Hannafin v.
Pelican Cracker Factory, Incorporated,7 and other prior cases on
the ground that in the Morgan case the plaintiff was informed
of and relied upon the mistaken diagnosis of the defendant-
employer's doctor 'that the pains were due to the nonaccidental
condition of prostatitis and that therefore no accidental injury
was sustained. 8 The crux of the decision seems to be the diag-
years from date of accident the rights of employees suffering from latent or
unknown injuries and thus to somewhat soften these harsh interpretations
of the 1926 amendment of the section.
13. 52 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1951).
14. Id. at 87.
15. Id. at 88.
16. Id. at 89.
17. See note 13, supra.
18. "We are unwilling to conclude that the plaintiff should be penalized
to the extent of having his suit for compensation dismissed because he was
oblivious that he had suffered accidental injury, and believed and relied upon
the representations made and the treatment given him by the doctor for the
Rust Engineering Company [defendant]." Id. at 89.
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nosis that no accidental injury had occurred, therefore mislead-
ing plaintiff into thinking no accident had' occurred and no cause
of action under the act existed.
In the Hannafin'9 case and in Richard v. Blair,20 where
defendants' pleas of prescription were sustained, suit was brought
more than one year after defendants' physicians had mistakenly
discharged the plaintiffs as cured of the effects of accidental
injury, but within one year of the correct diagnosis of disability
by plaintiffs' physicians. These cases are technically distinguish-
able, since the plaintiffs knew an accidental injury had occurred
and knew they were continuing to suffer pain even though defen-
dants' physicians diagnosed the pains' continuance as not related
to the injury, while in the Morgan case due to mistaken diagnosis
of defendant's physician the plaintiff did not even know an acci-
dental injury had occurred.
In Stephenson v. McCook,21 the plaintiff sustained a strain
or injury in the course of his employment in July, 1944, but the
resulting discomfort and passage of blood were mistakenly diag-
nosed by a physician as (non-accidental) "chronic non-specific
prostatitis." It was not until April 18, 1945, that the condition
was correctly diagnosed as a serious disabling spinal injury
resulting from the July, 1944, strain in the course of employment.
Suit was filed nearly twenty-one months after the accident, but
defendant's plea of prescription was sustained since plaintiff
alleged "he knew he had sustained an injury" and "suffered pain
and discomfort almost continuously from the time of the acci-
dent"22 though "he did not know the exact nature of the injury. '23
Perhaps the only distinguishing feature from the Morgan case is
that in the Stephenson case plaintiff was misled by the mistaken
diagnosis of his own physician rather than the defendant's,
although this seems unduly narrow a ground on which to have
denied recovery in the Stephenson case.
It is submitted that the result in Morgan v. Rust Engineering
Company is not only sound, but is also desirable. Furthermore,
taking into consideration the humanitarian aim of the compensa-
tion statute and its liberal construction in favor of protecting
19. Hannafln v. Pelican Cracker Wactory, Inc., 185 So. 479 (La. App. 1939).
20. 20 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 1945).
21. 27 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 1946).
22. Id. at 645.
23. Id. at 646.
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injured workmen, it seems to this writer that as a practical mat-
ter the injured employee does not have a remedy until his com-
plaint is correctly diagnosed as being both disabling and related
to the accident.
It should be borne in mind that in the early stages some dis-
abling injuries are difficult, if not impossible, to diagnose from
the point of view of objectively discernable symptoms. 24 It may
well be that although the claimant has actually sustained a per-
manently disabling injury, his alleged "backache" or other com-
plaint may be ascribed to imagination, temporary disuse, or
non-accidental causes by all examining physicians, in the absence
of any objective phenomena. From their point of view, the Han-
nafin and Richard plaintiffs were not in a position to prosecute
successfully their claim at the time of their discharge as cured
after the treatment of the initial injury, any more than was the
Morgan plaintiff who did not even know he had sustained an
accidental injury within the meaning of the act; although as
24. This seems to be particularly true of the proverbial "back injuries,"
lumbrosacral strains and herniated discs and other genuine back complaints
often being difficult to detect in their early stages and to distinguish from
the imaginary "back injuries" with which compensation attorneys have to
contend. It will be noted that the cases of Hannafin v. Pelican Cracker Fac-
tory, Inc., 185 So. 479 (La. App. 1939) (sacro-iliac strain); Stephenson v.
McCook Brothers Funeral Home, Inc., 27 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 1946) (ephy-
sitis of the dorsal vertebrae); and Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 49
So. 2d 38 (La. App. 1950) (herniated disc) dealt with "back Injuries" which
on trial upon the merits were proved to be serious and disabling injuries
which had been incorrectly and sincerely diagnosed as minor or non-
accidentgl injuries at their inception, in all of which cases recovery was
denied by application of prescription. In Perkins v. American Employers
Insurance Company, 53 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 1951), a sacro-Iliac strain was
sustained on October 4, 1948, six weeks following which upon advice of
defendant's physician plaintiff returned to work where he remained despite
(he testified) increasing pain until May 15, 1949, when (he testified) his back
"gave way." Prescription was sustained on the ground that if any injury
had occurred in October, 1948, it was of a continuing nature. In Morgan v.
Rust Engineering Co., 52 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1951), where a ruptured Inter-
vertebral disc was misdiagnosed as a non-accidental injury, probably at the
time of mistaken diagnosis the symptoms had not objectively manifested
themselves, as was true in the Hannafin, Stephenson, and Mottet cases also,
to the point where the physician could correctly diagnose them as seriously
disabling accidental injuries. Although the plaintiffs suffered subjective pain
and discomfort, possibly no objective symptoms were manifest sufficient to
support correct surgical diagnosis, and therefore manifest sufficient from the
point of view of evidence or proof to support a cause of action by plaintiffs
under the compensation statute. It will be remembered that the plaintiff in
the Mottet case (49 So. 2d 38, 40), in an effort to avoid prescription, unsuccess-
fully contended that the "accident and resulting injury" were not effected by
a single definite incident, but, on the contrary, that the "accident consisted
of repeated traumatic strains which eventually resulted in complete total
and permanent disability," a theory which the court conceded to be medically
correct.
COMMENTS
proved or alleged, in all cases actually the plaintiffs were totally
and permanently disabled. Nor did the fact that the mistaken
surgeon in the Stephenson case was of the plaintiff's choosing,
rather than of the defendant's as in the Morgan case,25 alter the
fact that an injured employee had suffered a latent or unknown
injury which from a practical point of view had not "manifested"
itself to the point where he could successfully prosecute a law-
suit. Evaluated as of the time of mistaken diagnosis, it is appar-
ent that the practicing attorney would have had to advise the
plaintiffs in the above cases that they had no cause of action for
compensation.
Since in no event may suit for disability resulting from latent
or unknown injuries be sustained more than two years from the
date of the accident,26 and since when suit is brought more than
one year after the injury or the last compensation payment, the
plaintiff will have the burden of proving the injury was not
"manifest" within the normal year; 2 it is felt that the defendant
will not be unduly prejudiced if the test of the Mottet case,
"When did the plaintiff's right and cause of action accrue,
'28
should be interpreted to mean that the action had accrued when
as a practical matter the injury was made "manifest" by at least
one medical diagnosis that it was disabling and caused by the
accident.
Natural Obligations
POLICY UNDERLYING ARTICLES ON NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
If the reason for enacting a law is known, it is usually of
some assistance in determining the meaning of the written pro-
25. In the great majority of cases, the impecunious injured workman is
forced to rely on specialists furnished by defendant. But adopting this
narrow test of "whose" physician incorrectly diagnosed the injury appears to
lead to technicalistic inquiry regarding selection and perhaps qualification of
physicians not actually related to the primary question-when did the injury
actually "manifest" itself. Nor does this line of inquiry take into account the
slow-developing latent Injury discussed in note 24, supra.
26. See La. R.S. (1950) 23:1209, and particularly the amendment of La.
Act 29 of 1934; Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8, 20 So. 2d 407 (1944);
Anderson v. Champagne, 8 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1942); Kinder v. Lake Charles
Harbor and Terminal Dist., 31 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 1947); Cook v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 42 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1949).
27. Since the delay period under the compensation statute is considered
a peremption rather than a prescription, "the workman's cause of action is
absolutely and irrevocably destroyed if not seasonably exercised, Brister v.
Wray, 183 La. 562, 164 So. 415; Heard v. Receivers of Parker Gravel Co., 194
So. 142," Morgan v. Rust Engineering, 52 So. 2d 86, 89 (La. App. 1951).
28. 49 So. 2d 38, 40 (La. App. 1950).
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